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Abstract 
We investigate the relationship between religion and trust. Using a 
questionnaire, we measure: i) general religiosity, and; ii) the extent of 
religious beliefs, experience, and ritual. These are then analyzed with behavior 
in a trust game (Berg et al., Games and Economic Behavior, 1995), which we 
also extend by providing information of a potential trustee’s religiosity in 
certain tasks. We find that trusting increases with the potential trustee’s 
religiosity. The extent to which trusting increases with a trustee’s religiosity, 
in turn, increases with a truster’s religiosity. Trustworthiness also increases 
with religiosity, and at an increasing rate. 
PsycINFO classification: 2920, 3020 
 JEL classification: C72, C91, Z12 
Keywords: Religiosity, Trust, Stereotype, Questionnaire, Experiment. 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
Existing research suggests the importance of considering the relationship between 
religion and economic performance, via economic behavior. For instance, production 
suffers when work hours are sacrificed for religious activities (Lipford and Tollison, 
2003); religious beliefs affect economic growth (Barro and McLeary, 2003). Lipford et al. 
(1993) show that religion provides a public good by promoting pro-social behavior. This 
paper experimentally investigates the relationship between religion and trust.  
Trust, an element of social capital (Glaeser et al., 2000), has the power to enable the 
attainment of Pareto-improvements, notwithstanding there is scope for cooperation, i.e. 
individuals themselves stand to gain. A prevalence of trust and trustworthiness reduces 
downside default risks, and in turn lowers the cost of enforcing contracts, e.g. for loans. It 
is a predictor of economic success (Arrow, 1972), e.g., it improves socio-economic life 
via better judicial efficiency and less government corruption (La Porta et al., 1997).  
Religion can influence trust directly, especially within religious communities, by 
promoting it via ritual (Iannaccone, 1998; Ruffle and Sosis, 2004). Religion can also 
influence trust indirectly, via psychological effects. Social categorization is the way by 
which individuals “simplify and systematize the [complicated] world into categories” 
(p.264, Brown, 2000). Categories facilitate the attribution of certain characteristics (e.g. 
“trustworthiness”) shared by those belonging to a group (e.g. “highly religious people”), 
i.e., group stereotyping (c.f. Fiske, 1998). Orbell et al. (1992) report a widespread belief, 
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   shared by people of both high or low religiosity alike, that more religious people are more 
cooperative. Our paper provides an incentive-compatible test of such beliefs, in terms of 
trust. It further investigates if such beliefs – if they exist – are legitimate beliefs in the 
sense that they derive from aspects of social reality (Brewer and Campbell, 1976; Major, 
1994), i.e. trustworthiness indeed increases with religiosity. Beyond discrimination due to 
stereotypes, categorization can also lead to intergroup rivalry (Tajfel et al., 1971), an 
issue that we do not focus on.  
Existing research has tested the predictive power of questionnaires on economic 
behavior such as in Berg et al.’s (1995) trust game (e.g., General Social Survey: Glaeser 
et al., 2000, and; Machiavelianism scale: Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002), and Dictator and 
Ultimatum games (Multi-dimensional Religiosity: Tan, 2005). We follow Tan’s (2005) 
procedure, which aims to maintain autonomy between the data collected on a subject’s 
religiosity and economic behavior. For this, the data elicitation process involves two 
phases. In Phase 1 subjects complete a questionnaire containing randomly ordered 
religiosity and distractor questions. Two weeks later, in phase 2, they play the trust game, 
with monetary incentives corresponding to the outcome of their interactions.  
We find evidence that more (less) religious individuals are trusted more (less), 
relative to when the decision is made without information on the potential trustee. The 
degree to which the amount of trust invested increases with information on the potential 
trustee’s religiosity, further, increases with the truster’s religiosity. We also find that 
trustworthiness increases with religiosity, at an increasing rate. Section 2 discusses the 
relevant background for this study. Section 3 describes the procedure, and Section 4 




2.1.  Religiosity 
 
There is strong evidence for the multi-dimensionality of religiosity (e.g., Stark and 
Glock, 1968, and; De Jong et al., 1976). The religiosity structure is typically made up of 
three core dimensions: belief, experience, and ritual. The belief dimension captures the 
closeness to which an individual’s set of beliefs ascribes to the ideological constructs of 
the religion, namely its theology. It consists of statements (of faith) on the (i) existence of 
a divine being and its nature; (ii) content and goals of the will of the divine being, and the 
role of nature and humans in this will, and; (iii) actions required to fulfill this divine will. 
The ritual dimension measures one’s involvement in a variety of religious practices and 
the relationship between different practices (different individuals weight activities 
differently and so practice each with different frequencies). The experience dimension 
measures the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to have had encounters of a 
religious context (e.g. sense of salvation, sin, and closeness to and fear for the Divine). 
In addition, peripheral dimensions such as religious knowledge, and attitudes on 
social  and moral consequences can also reflect religiosity – albeit not central to the 
definition of religiosity unlike belief, experience, and ritual.
1 We do not consider these 
three dimensions in our analysis.
 2 
 
2.2.  Trust 
                                                 
1 Consequential dimensions are excluded from the inner structure of religiosity, because other reasons such 
as political orientation influence it (as argued by De Jong et al. (1976) and Huber (2003)). A data reduction 
test on questionnaire responses from our sample corroborates on this result.  
2 If opinions on moral and social consequences were correlated with actions in social/moral dilemmas, we 
get biased when analyzing the relationship between religiosity measures and trusting and trustworthiness.   
   Trusting behavior and trustworthiness can be measured by attitudinal surveys such as 
the General Social Survey (GSS). Glaeser et al. (2000), for example, point out that these 
questions are abstract and vague and may not always serve to capture actual behavior.  
An alternative is to rely on experiments with monetary incentives tied to the actions 
and outcomes of subject behavior. Commonly used to this purpose is Berg et al.’s (1995) 
trust game, also known as an investment game. In this game, Proposer (the first mover, 
i.e., the potential “truster”) has to decide how much money to send to Responder (the 
second mover, i.e., the potential “trustee”). For each monetary unit Proposer 1 sends, 
Responder receives three. Responder then decides how much money to send back to 
Proposer. Assume, for now, that all players are purely self-interested. By backward 
induction reasoning, since Responder will keep everything received from Proposer, it 
pays of for Proposer, who knows that Responder will send nothing “back”, to send 
nothing to Responder in the first place. There is, however, scope for cooperation. Both 
Proposer and Responder stand to gain if Proposer invests trust in Responder (by sending 
money), and Responder reciprocates this trust by sending enough money back. Pareto-




The experiment was split into two phases, conducted with a two-week lag separating 
the two phases, to preserve autonomy between data elicited on religiosity (questionnaire) 
and trust (experimental). It took place in the European University Viadrina, Germany, in 
November – December 2004. Forty-eight subjects participated both in phases 1 and 2. 
 
3.1. Phase 1: Religiosity 
 
Questionnaires were distributed via email. Religiosity questions were Judeo-Christian 
oriented, for suitability with the subject pool. They follow De Jong et al’s (1976)
3: 
seventeen for religious belief, experience, and ritual, and eleven for religious knowledge, 
social and moral consequences, which were interpretable as related to the thirty-one 
distractors. Example questions include: for belief “What do you believe about Jesus?” 
and “Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing your conception of 
sin?”; for experience “There are particular moments in my life when I feel "close" to the 
Divine.” and “I know what is feels like to repent and experience forgiveness of sin.”, and; 
for ritual “How often do you attend Sabbath worship services?” and “Do you contribute 
funds to church?”. Following Tan (2005), the distractors fall under economics, 
environmentalism, politics, and society, and employ phrasings similar to the religiosity 
questions; they were designed to prevent subjects from ‘seeing through’ the experimental 
objective.
 All questions were presented in random sequences unique to each respective 
subject, allowing us to (i) identify subjects; (ii) indirectly control for biasness related to 
subject fatigue, and; (iii) help check if they were completed in privacy. Subjects 
responded to categorical and Likert scale multiple-choices. They were instructed to 
complete the questionnaire unaided, without breaks, in complete alone. Attached 
instructions promised confidentiality. Responses were anonymously deposited into a 
sealed box in the experimental laboratory, within three days of receipt.
 4 
                                                 
3 It serves as a reliable and appropriate measuring instrument of religiosity for our purpose. De Jong et al. 
derived these questions from other questionnaires. It contains items representative of the core dimensions, 
and common to standard religiosity questionnaires (e.g. Stark and Glock, 1968; Huber, 2003), yet 
manageable in size. It is also cross-culturally tested (Germany and USA), for replicability. 
4  Integrity Criteria: i) One distractor question included proposed answers completely irrelevant to the 
question: subjects not paying attention to, or randomly, answering the questions would possibly answer this 
    
3.2.  Phase 2: Trust 
 
Two weeks later, subjects participated in a computerized experiment of an extension 
of Berg et al.’s (1995) trust game. Each session comprised of two stages: the Proposer 
stage and the Responder stage. In half the sessions (staggered), subjects played Proposer 
in stage 1 followed by Responder in stage 2. The other sessions counterbalanced this with 
respective stages arranged in the reverse order, i.e., a Responder stage followed by a 
Proposer stage. Every subject played both stages. Besides experimentally controlling for 
possible order effects by counterbalancing, we also run preliminary statistical tests to 
check for potential order effects due to letting subjects play in both roles. 
Proposer stage. Here subjects play the role of Proposer. This stage comprises of 
twenty-six rounds. In each round subjects have 10 points (each worth €0.50), of which 
they must decide to pass or keep. Responder receives 3 points, for each point Proposer 
passed. In all but one round, Proposer was provided a piece of information about 
Responder, which varied across rounds. Five rounds contained information on Proposer’s 
religiosity level (we labeled this information as “religious orientation”, ranging on a 
scale of 1–5). To facilitate perceptions of relative similarity (with oneself), we presented 
the subjects with the following statement in the pre-experimental instructions. “‘Religious 
orientation’ tells you how religiously oriented a person is, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
represents a person with weak religious orientation, and 5 represents a person with strong 
religious orientation.” The words “weak” and “strong” defines the polar points and 
implements meta-contrast for the scale. A Responder with a religious orientation of 1 (5) 
is therefore the prototypical low (high) religiosity type. We did not provide information 
on one’s own religiosity to avoid inducing framing effects of further intergroup biases 
such as those found in Tajfel et al. (1971); meta-contrast is thus on a self-assessed basis. 
For benchmarking control, we had one round with no information whatsoever (a 
baseline round). In addition, to avoid subjects from seeing through the experimental veil, 
i.e., knowing that our experiment was about religion and trust, in the remaining rounds 
we provided distractor information on categories consistent with those used in Phase 1 
(labeled as “environmental friendliness”, “moral emphasis”, “political inclination”, and 
“social attitude”, also ranging on a scale of 1–5). Subjects received each piece of 
information in different rounds, and in different random sequences for each subject. 
Responder stage. Here subjects play the role of Responder. This stage contained one 
round with ten tasks. We used the strategy method (Selten, 1967). For each number of 
points Proposer might possibly send to Responder, Responder had to state how much to 
send (back) to Proposer. This allows us to obtain data on each subject’s full strategy set. 
We do not use the “hot” procedure (where Responder receives feedback on how much 
Proposer passed) also because Berg et al. (1995) find that more trust begets more 
reciprocity. In turn, if one is more religious and trusted more because of this, our data on 
responses to a single given level of trust will be confounded by the situational factor, 
rather than capturing purely the relationship between one’s religiosity and 
trustworthiness, ceteris paribus.
5 Another function of the strategy method is to eliminate 
confounds from these “self-fulfilling stereotypes” (Snyder, 1981). 
Neutral language was used to avoid potential framing effects (e.g. “Participant A” 
instead of “Proposer” or “Truster”, and “Pass” instead of “Invest” or “Return”). Subjects 
                                                                                                                                                 
question. ii) If we received questionnaires of similar question sequences, there was a high likelihood that it 
was filled in together with at least one other subject, not in privacy - it was printed off the same unique file. 
5 A natural extension is to provide information of Proposer’s religiosity. We did not do this because it: 1) 
requires the addition of 250 more tasks per subject resulting in bias from fatigue; 2) confounds decisions in 
the Proposer stage with intended reciprocity related to intergroup bias, beyond that due to stereotyping. 
   were randomly seated upon arrival at the laboratory. Partitioned terminals prevented 
communication. After reading an instruction sheet, subjects answered a control 
questionnaire to ensure that the tasks were understood. Subjects with incorrect answers 
were individually and verbally advised before being allowed to begin. No feedback on 
outcomes was provided during the experiment to maintain independence across decisions. 
Subjects were paid €8 for phase 1 (questionnaire). Experimental earnings depended on 
the outcome from one randomly chosen round from either stage one or two and random 
pair-wise matching with another subject with the information relevant in that round. Each 
point earned in phase 2 was worth €0.50. There was no show-up fee. All payments 
(averaging €17≈US$24, for 1–1.5 hours of work) were privately collected a week later, 






Our measures of religiosity are based on the structural definitions of religiosity. We 
performed factor analysis with and without oblique (varimax) rotation.
6 The unrotated 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) yields a solution of three factors (explaining for 
68.5% of the total variance).
 Communalities on all variables are high except for one item 
(0.41). In the unrotated structure, most variables load strongly (ranging from 0.46–0.92) 
and uniquely on the first factor, which we interpret as general religiosity. Rotation 
reveals a clearer classification of variables; all variables remain powerfully loaded on at 
least one factor. Most items load under the theoretically expected factors, which can be 
interpreted as belief,  experience,  and  ritual; this agrees with De Jong et al.’s (1976) 
multi-dimensional structure, and provides us with an interpretation in line with those 
found in other studies (c.f. Stark and Glock, 1968; Tan, 2005).
7 Measures (factor scores) 
for each subject’s general religiosity (GENRELI), belief (BELIEF), experience 
(EXPERIENCE), and ritual (RITUAL) are computed for use in the analysis below.
 8  
 
4.2.  Religiosity and Confounds 
 
First, we checked if there were any order effects due to subjects playing in both roles 
of the trust game. We find no evidence of such order effects. The amount of money 
passed in the Proposer and Responder stages are not significantly different when played 
in either order. Further note that the pooled sample takes advantage of counterbalancing 
as an experimental control.  
Next, we turn to check for possible confounds of gender on religiosity. Our sample 
contained 29 (60.4%) females, and 19 (39.6%) males. Considering Croson and Buchan’s 
(1999) finding that gender and behavior in the trust game are related, we first check if 
there are gender-religiosity interactions. If such interactions exist, one would have to 
control for them. Using Mann-Whitney U-tests, we find no significant gender differences 
in religiosity, both in terms of general religiosity, and each of the three multi-dimensional 
                                                 
6 Preliminary tests confirm our sample’s suitability of for factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy is 0.87, while Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity has p<0.0001. All subject cases satisfied 
the Integrity Criteria (see note 4). We adopt Kaiser’s eigenvalue of 1.00 as a minimum threshold. 
7 The belief items regarding “afterlife” and “immortality” load stronger on the second dimension, and so 
this dimension can be alternatively interpreted as a “spirituality” dimension. The ritual item of “church 
membership”, the experience items of “forgiveness” and “being a sinner” load stronger on the belief 
dimension. These overlaps reflect the strong links of concepts underlying the Judeo-Christian institution. 
8 Factor scores provide a measure of religiosity for each subject, along each corresponding dimension. They 
are standardized z-scores, weighted on corresponding factor loadings, and suitable for regression purposes.  
   measures. The following analyses are therefore performed with controls for confounds of 
possible gender effects on behavior, without controls for gender-religiosity interactions.
9 
 
4.3.  Religiosity and Trusting 
 
Table 1 shows the mean amount passed by Proposer, for each corresponding level of 
religiosity for Responder (RELI), and the baseline without information. The mean pass 
increases (decreases) by 0.2 to 0.5 points per RELI more (less) from the midpoint of RELI 
(3.5, and equal to the baseline mean pass). Spearman’s correlation coefficient for 
PASSPROP (proportion of initial wealth sent by Proposer) and RELI is 0.15 (p=0.01). 
<Insert Table 1 about here.> 
This result is robust when we regress PASSPROP on RELI (Responder’s “religious 
orientation”, ranging from 1 to 5), even when we control for confounds from gender 
(GENDER=0 for females, and =1 for males) and Proposer’s own religiosity (GENRELI) – 
the uni-dimensional religiosity model.
10 Table 2 reports these results in models 1, 2, and 
3. Note that the low adjusted R
2 values are typical of such studies (e.g. Glaeser et al., 
2000). We find no gender effect on PASSPROP, replicating Croson and Buchan’s result. 
GENRELI has a negative effect on PASS, but this effect tends on the borderline of 
significance. The coefficient for RELI is positive and significant. 
<Insert Table 2 about here.> 
Next, we consider the effect of Proposer’s religiosity on a multi-dimensional basis in 
models 4 and 5. In the multi-dimensional religiosity models, we replace GENRELI with 
the measures for each of the three dimensions of religiosity, namely, BELIEF, RITUAL, 
and  EXPERIENCE. The coefficient for BELIEF is negative but only marginally 
significant. The result of the significantly positive RELI coefficient continues to hold.  
  
RESULT 1: Trust, as invested by a Proposer, increases with a Responder’s religiosity. 
 
Does religiosity have higher order effects? By considering the interactions between 
RELI and each religiosity measure, we test if Proposer’s own religiosity influences the 
degree to which RELI is a determinant of trust. Referring once again to Table 2, we find 
that the RELIµGENRELI term is positive: the degree to which PASSPROP increases with 
RELI (Responder’s religiosity) increases with Proposer’s own religiosity GENRELI. The 
multi-dimensional model shows that this 2
nd-order effect is due to BELIEF.  
 
RESULT 2: The degree to which trust increases with a Responder’s religiosity, in turn, 
increases with the Proposer’s own religiosity. 
 
We further investigate this effect from a “group” perspective, to check if result 3 
entails favoritism, discrimination, or both. For this the sample is ordinally-split on the 
median of GENRELI into two equal-sized sub-samples: a “high religiosity” group (HRG), 
and a “low religiosity” group (LRG). Others such as Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) and 
Meier-Pesti and Kirchler (2003) have employed similar methods, i.e., dichotomizing 
samples, to analyze and compare group behavior and processes. Separate regression 
analyses, with MALE and RELI as independent variables on each sub-sample, show that 
Proposers who are relatively more religious explain chiefly for the significance of the 
                                                 
9 Our results below are robust to the addition of the gender-religiosity interaction term to the regressions.  
10 The advantage over using factor scores in regression analyses over alternatives such as comparison of 
mean behaviour of cluster groups is that memberships are defined by the degrees, not directions, of 
similarity in (multivariate) scores between subject cases. Another benefit is the ability to statistically 
control for confounding effects such as gender.  
   RELI coefficient (see models 1a and 1b in Table 2). Friedman’s tests confirm that there is 
no significant difference for PASSPROP for each RELI in the LRG (c
2=3.14, p=0.54), 
while those in the HRG assign significantly different levels of PASSPROP to different 
levels of RELI ( c
2=23.25, p=0.0001). Figure 1 paints a similar picture, where 
DPASSPROP (the difference between PASSPROP given RELI, and PASS in the baseline 
with no information) monotonically increases from –0.12 to 0.10 and this pattern is 
pronounced for the HRG, but not so for the LRG.  
<Insert Figure 1 about here.> 
RESULT 3: Proposers of high religiosity trust Responders of high (low) religiosity more 
(less); for Proposers of low religiosity there is no significant effect. 
 
DPASSPROP>0 (<0) can also be interpreted as favoritism (discrimination).
11 To test the 
alternative hypothesis of pure intergroup bias (as opposed to just stereotyping), we tested 
for relationships between dummy variables DISC (=1 if DPASSPROP<0, outgroup 
discrimination) and/or FAV (=1 if DPASSPROP>0, ingroup favoritism), or DPASSPROP, 
with meta-contrast SOCDIST (social distance from self to other), but found no evidence 
of pure ingroup favoritism or outgroup discrimination, except for subjects of RELI = 5 for 
which pure intergroup bias behavior necessarily coincides with stereotyping behavior. 
 
4.4.  Religiosity and Trustworthiness 
 
Table 3 shows the mean proportion of wealth returned by Responder (RETPROP) for 
each possible pass. Both RETURN and RETPROP increases with the potential amount 
passed by Proposer (PASSED). 
<Insert Table 3 about here.> 
Table 4 reports the relationship between religiosity and trustworthiness, where we 
regress RETPROP (the proportion of the amount returned by Responder, of that received 
from Proposer) on GENRELI (models 1 and 2 for the uni-dimensional model), and 
separately, the three dimensional measures of religiosity (model 4, for the multi-
dimensional religiosity model). In addition, we control for GENDER and PASSED. 
<Insert Table 4 about here.> 
We find that RETPROP decreases with GENDER (females return more) and PASSED. 
Once again, this replicates Croson and Buchan’s result. Turning to the question of 
religiosity, the uni-dimensional religiosity model shows that GENRELI has a positive and 
significant effect on RETPROP. The multi-dimensional religiosity model shows that this 
positive effect is attributable to RITUAL and perhaps EXPERIENCE. 
 
RESULT 4: A Responder’s trustworthiness increases with religiosity. 
 
Let us now consider higher order effects: does the rate at which a Responder 
reciprocates increasing levels of trust co-vary with religiosity? Table 4 reports 
regressions with the addition of interaction terms between PASSED and religiosity. 
Model 3 finds the interaction term PASSEDµGENRELI as positive and significant. The 




RESULT 5 :  The rate at which a Responder reciprocates increasing levels of trust 
increases with religiosity. 
                                                 
11 Zizzo (2003) defines “favoritism” and “discrimination” as deviations from behavior in the baseline. 
12 It is clear that RITUAL has an effect, but the influence of EXPERIENCE does not receive unequivocal 
support (comparing models 4 and 5). 
   5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Like Berg et al. (1995) and its many replications, we find that (more) trust begets 
(more) reciprocity. Also, our results replicate Croson and Buchan’s (1999) findings of 
gender effects. We found no gender differences for Proposer, but female Responders 
were found to be trustworthier, returning more of what they had received. 
We found that overall, the amount of trust a Proposer invests in a Responder 
increases with the Responder’s religiosity. Religiosity is effectively used as a category to 
guide decision-making – but not by everyone. The degree to which a Proposer relies on 
information on a Responder’s religiosity depends on the Proposer’s own religiosity.  
Bruner (1957) explains that the likelihood of using certain social categories increases 
with the degree to which one has “access” to it, i.e., “what a person brings to the situation 
[…] contributes to the ease or difficulty with which categories are assessed” (p.273, 
Brown, 2000). Accessibility can be affected by a perceiver’s experience, personal 
disposition – which affects their habit of using certain categories, and the current task or 
goal of the decision-maker, in relations to the category (Brown, 2000). The use of 
religiosity as a category was perhaps more accessible for those who are more religious. 
The underlying assumption of this argument rests on the likelihood that more religious 
people interact with others of high religiosity more frequently, while at the same time 
religion is a more central concept in their lives, and so the category of religiosity is more 
salient to them. In turn, those who are more religious and perceived the stereotype (that 
trustworthiness increases with religiosity) as a legitimate belief deemed it useful for 
decision-making. 
Proposers of high religiosity invested more trust in those of high religiosity, and less 
in those of low religiosity, while those of low religiosity displayed no systematic nor 
significant evidence of discrimination. For this, we make no claim that pure intergroup 
biases (such as those found in Sherif et al., 1961, and Tajfel et al., 1971) cannot explain 
this observation. Our results, however, appear to point favorably towards the stereotyping 
hypothesis. Further note that since subjects were not told their own religiosity, the pure 
intergroup bias story appears somewhat far-fetched, due to the weak or abstract perceived 
entitativity (Campbell, 1958) our experimental design implements.  
For Responders, trustworthiness increases with religiosity. Further, the rate at which a 
Responder reciprocates increasing levels of trust increases with religiosity, and this effect 
is due to the dimensions of ritual (see Iannaccone, 1998, Lipford et al., 1993, and Ruffle 
and Sosis, 2004, where religious ritual promotes pro-social behavior) and experience 
(Tan, 2005, shows that the (spiritual) experience dimension is positively correlated with 
rejection of low offers in the UG, the dark side of reciprocity). Thus, the Proposer 
behavior we observed is possibly explained by the fact that the stereotype is a “legitimate 
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   Tables and Figures 
 





RELI  1 2 3 4 5  Baseline 
PASS  2.85 3.04 3.46 3.94 4.19 3.51 
 
Table 2  Pass ratio of Proposer* 
 
   








   * Standardized beta’s reported since religiosity measures are z-scores. N=240 for each    
 Model  1     1a     1b     2     3     4     5    
MALE  0.02    -0.03    0.07  0.01    0.01    0.02    0.02   
RELI  0.16  ***  0.06    0.26  0.16  ***  0.16  ***  0.16  ***  0.16  *** 
GENRELI              0.04    -0.21           
GENRELI by RELI                  0.28  **         
BELIEF                      0.11  **  -0.23  * 
EXPERIENCE                      -0.03    0.06   
RITUAL                      -0.03    -0.19   
BELIEF by RELI                          0.38  *** 
EXPERIENCE by RELI                        -0.10   
RITUAL by RELI                          0.18   
Adjusted R
2  0.02    -0.01    0.06    0.01    0.02    0.02    0.04    
model. *(**)[***] denotes 1-tailed p < 0.1(0.05)[0.01]. 
 




PASSED  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
RETPROPN  0.13 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 
 











         * Standardized beta’s reported since religiosity measures are z-scores.   
Model 1     2     3     4     5    
MALE  -0.20  ***  -0.20  ***  -0.20  ***  -0.20  ***  -0.20  *** 
PASSED  0.23  ***  0.23  ***  0.23  ***  0.23  ***  0.23  *** 
GENRELI      0.13  ***  -0.04           
GENRELI by PASSED          0.20  **         
BELIEF              0.00    -0.12  * 
EXPERIENCE              0.14  ***  0.11   
RITUAL              0.10  ***  -0.06   
BELIEF by PASSED                  0.14  * 
EXPERIENCE by PASSED                0.03   
RITUAL by PASSED                  0.18  ** 
Adjusted R
2  0.09    0.10    0.11    0.11    0.12    
    N=480 for each model. *(**)[***] denotes 1-tailed p < 0.1(0.05)[0.01]. 
 























   